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MANAGING THE Y2K RISK:
DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
FOR THE YEAR 2000 COMPUTER BUG
BARBARA ELIZABETH

W ARNERt

The Year 2000 computer bug is more than a technical problem: it poses
grave business risks and legal liabilities for a number of actors. In this
article, the author examines the potential liability ofcorporate directors
in Canada for Year 2000 problems affecting the corporations they
serve. The article focuses on the duties imposed on directors under the
Canada Business Corporations Act and the remedies available to
shareholders in the statute. Additionally, the author draws an analogy
between the potential defenses that may be available to directors
targeted in Year 2000 litigation and the due diligence defense as it is
used in environmental and computer virus cases. The author concludes
that although the likelihood of Year 2000 litigation is high, so is the
likelihood that directors will be able to launch successful defenses to the
litigation through statute and common law.
Le probleme de l'informatique de l'an 2000 est plus qu 'un simple
probleme technique. fl pose de graves risques pour les entreprises et
entrafne une responsabilite legale pour un grand nombre d 'acteurs.
Dans cet article, l'auteure examine les responsabilites possibles pour
les directeurs des corporations au Canada a l'egard de ce probleme.
L 'article se concentre sur les responsabilites imposees aux directeurs
en vertu de la Loi sur les Corporations Commerciales et les recours
disponibles aux actionnaires. De plus, l'auteure demontre l'analogie
entre les defenses qui peuvent etre disponsibles aux directeurs et la
defense de "prudence et diligence" utilisee dans les cas de virus

t B.A. Hons. (Carleton), LLB. anticipated 1999 (Dalhousie). The author is indebted to
Professors Christopher Nicholls and Michael Deturbide for their valuable comments. The
author also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Marcia Mills and Cindy
McGann, both corporate counsel at Corel Corporation, and the assistance and good will of
Julian Eglestaff.
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informatiques. L 'auteur conclut que les probabilites des problemes de
l 'an 2000 sont etevees. fly a aussi probabilite que les directeurs seront
capables d'obtenir avec succes des defenses pour les litiges a travers le
droit statutaire et la common law.

There is a new type of directors' and officers' liability case on the
horizon, and as the millennium draws closer, the time is ripe for
companies to prepare for litigation. The Year 2000 bug has the potential
to cause harm to businesses, consumers, shareholders, and if
shareholders's litigation is successful, directors and officers. This paper
will examine the technical problem, the impact this problem has on
computer systems, and the resulting legal problems of liability for
directors and officers in Canada.
In pa1iicular, this paper will discuss the type of claim shareholders
may bring against the directors and officers, and the standards that those
directors and officers will likely need to meet. The Canada Business
Corporations Act [hereinafter CECA] is used to illustrate directors'
liability under federal jurisdiction, although readers should be aware
that similar provisions govern corporations incorporated in provincial
jurisdictions. A discussion of the defenses available to directors will
follow, including a possible Canadian adoption of the U.S. "business
judgment rule," the use of expert reports, as permitted in the CECA, and
the defense of due diligence. Since the problem is still theoretical, there
is no case law available directly on point. However, analogies can be
made to the use and applicability of the due diligence defense in
environmental cases and computer virus cases. An examination of what
the due diligence standard will require in this specific instance will
follow. Once this review of standards, legislation, and case law is
complete, the paper will attempt to predict the probable outcomes of
Year 2000 litigation.

I. Y2K: A BRIEF TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
What is required of directors, officers, and their staff will be directly
guided by the types of technical problems they encounter with the
computer bug and the nature of their business. Therefore, while the
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focus of this paper will be on the legal liabilities, analogies, and
standards, it is crucial to thoroughly examine the structure and effects of
the Year 2000 bug itself. The Year 2000 bug, called "Y2K" for short,
stems from the need in the early days of computers to conserve memory
and reduce costs. Programmers wrote dates in two digits instead of four,
and programmed the computers to assume that all dates were in the
1900s. They assumed that when memory and time were available, their
programs would be replaced or rewritten with four digit dates in time for
the tum of the century. Unfortunately, the problem persists in much
software and many computer chips. 1 The year 2000 is problematic,
because when the date rolls over from "99" to "00," a "non Year 2000
compliant" computer will assume the year is 1900, not 2000. If this
problem is not fixed, it will result in unrealistic and incorrect
calculations of birth dates, ages, billing dates and, due dates-virtually
any calculation that requires dates. Further, it is likely that programs or
products that do not even use dates in their output will be affected since
many programs query the system clock (where the date problem will
occur) for routine things, such as timing the use of an automobile's
carburetor, or the usage time of an elevator.
Another part of the bug may cause problems in certain sectors that
produce date sensitive data. The Year 2000 is a leap year, but the year
1900 was not; therefore, some systems will have difficulty with the extra
day in February, and cause data to be corrupted. The problem may affect
other businesses, if public utilities and public transportation systems do
not correct for the leap year. Such a spinoff effect could be common
with Y2K defects in software and hardware. If one contributor to a
network miscalculates or shuts down because of the bug, the whole
system may be corrupted or shut down. Hence, it is crucial for all
businesses in data-intensive sectors to work together to ensure
compatibility within their joint ventures. Phone companies are a good
example of the need for coordinated, timely action: they all rely on
hardware, software, and firmware that must all be compliant for the
system to function properly.
A less prominent but potentially hazardous problem exists in the
present use of"99." Not only is it used to represent the last year before the
1
See for e.g. "Ifit's 1/1100 Then It must Be 1900!: What the Y2K Problem Is and Why It's
Important." PC Novice 7:2 (Jan. 1999) 4 at 4.
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rollover to 1999, but "99" has been used as a place holder in organizing
computer code. Its function in some programs is to indicate that the data
reference should never expire. However, if this is overlooked while the
program is being fixed for the Year 2000 bug, the place holder may be
inadvertently altered or simply miscalculated. Data that was meant to be
held permanently would then be inaccessible or invalid. 2 Obviously, this
result might shut down or invalidate programs that rely on that archived
data.

II. Y2K AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS
Any of these Y2K problems may create business disruption. It is
possible that businesses may shut down for weeks or months, as they
struggle to manage computer systems in that the Year 2000 bug was
ignored or poorly managed. 3 To avoid a shut down, businesses will need
to spend large amounts of time, money, human and technical resources
to get the programming problems fixed before the rollover to the year
2000. Even in this scenario, however, it is realistic to expect some minor
delays and money losses as the instances of the bug are encountered and
repaired. 4 In any case, many businesses in the manufacturing and
service industries will face unhappy customers whose purchases,
products, or services do not function properly. Businesses dealing in
data may face users and shareholders who are frustrated at incorrect
data, dropping stock prices, and inefficient or sloppy management of the
Year 2000 bug. Unlike many litigious situations, the Year 2000 problem
is a known problem with a clear solution. If a business acts in a timely
manner, it can address the problem with the correct, technical solution,
and avoid many or all of the disruptions and difficulties above.
As the year 2000 comes closer, the public is becoming increasingly
inundated with information about Y2K and its possible effects. From
1997 to 1998, The Globe and Mail published dozens of articles on the

2
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants "Guidance for Directors the Millennium
Bug" online: <www.cica.cca/new/index.htm> (date accessed: March 7, 1998).
3
E. Youdon & J. Youdon, Time Bomb 2000: What the Computer Crisis Means to You
(Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1998) at 15-17.
4
Ibid. at 15.
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subject. 5 At the beginning of April, 1998, CBC Radio One aired three
"Millennium bug" stories in one week, all focussing on government
preparations for meeting its Year 2000 deadline, April 1, 1999. 6 The
trouble is that the vast majority of companies, and consequently their
directors, have not put their mind to the problem in a formal way.
Besides anecdotal evidence of this ignorance or inaction, there has been
proper statistical analysis of the situation. In February 1998, Statistics
Canada released a repo1i entitled "The Preparedness of Canadian
Business for the Year 2000 Computer Problem." 7 The lack of
preparedness is clear: Only 9% of Canadian businesses taken from a
stratified sample of 2,000 businesses have tackled the issue through a
formal plan. 36% are employing infonnal steps, 46% of businesses are
aware of the problem but are not acting, and another 9% are not aware of
the problem. 8
As one might suspect, the businesses with the fewest resourcesthe businesses with fewer than fifty-one employees-are generally not
aware of the problem and are doing little about it. These companies
represent nearly all of the 9% of non-aware companies, and 51 % of the
aware but inactive companies. 9 Many medium-sized firms are at risk as
well: both small and medium-sized businesses use and rely on
miscellaneous office equipment, that is at risk of being affected by the
bug. 10 Naturally, if the directors and officers of these companies do not
take any action, the risk of harm to their businesses increases severely.
Action on dealing with Y2K also varies dramatically from sector to
sector. Throughout the Statistics Canada results, it is clear that the
finance, insurance, and manufacturing industries are the most active and
prepared, while the trade sector and other services are the least active,
and ill-prepared. 11 This may be partially related to the way these
businesses use data and computers, but the results also show that nearly

The Globe and Mail Online< www.globeandmail.com> (date accessed: April 28, 1998).
The Government Fiscal Year 2000 begins on this date; the government's informal
deadline to begin testing their Year 2000 solutions was April 1, 1998.
7
Statistics Canada (Small Businesses and Special Surveys Division), The Preparedness of
Canadian Business for the Year 2000 Computer Problem (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1998).
8 Ibid. at 3.
9
Supra note 7 at 4.
10
Supra note 7 at 4-6.
11
Supra note 7 at 3-8.
5
6
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every business relies on some miscellaneous office equipment. 12
Consequently, even though over 55% of Canadian firms are not taking
action on the issue, nearly every Canadian firm is in a position to take
steps to solve the problem. As will be shown in the legal analysis below,
companies not acting will have to follow the lead set by firms taking
formal steps. Ultimately, then, only 9% of the Canadian business
population may be properly shielded from liability.

III. DIRECTORIAL DUTIES
Directors and officers have reason to consider the legal problems arising
from the year 2000. Shareholders who see their investments negatively
affected by the company's performance after December 31, 1999 may
find that their losses are due to the corporate treatment of the Year 2000
bug. Jeff Jinnett identifies four potential causes of actions in lawsuits
against boards of directors and top management: ( 1) waste of corporate
assets; (2) breach of fiduciary duty, duty of due care and/or duty of
loyalty; (3) securities law violations; (4) breaches of duties under
banking laws, pension laws, and similar laws." 13 Jinnett's list, while not
exhaustive, illustrates the potential scope of Y2K litigation, although
this paper focuses on the second action, particularly directorial duty of
due care.
In Canada, Y2K suits are likely to proceed with Jinnett's second
action, since directors owe a statutorily-entrenched fiduciary duty to the
corporations that they serve. The ability of shareholders to litigate on
behalf of the corporation is set out in the CECA. The legislation allows
the shareholders a distinct role, and an ability to sue a director(s) for
breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the corporation to which the duty is
owed. Therefore, derivative actions are a useful starting point for
considering Y2K litigation. As section 239 of the CECA indicates,

Supra note 7 at 4-6.
J. Jinnett, "Year 2000 'Millennium Bug' Litigation," LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene &
MacRae L.L.P., online: <www.llgm.FIRM/article5.htm> (date accessed: March 20, 1998).
The limited scope of this article is sufficient only to cover the second of Jinnett's suggestions;
the other potential areas of director concerns for Y2K are beyond the scope of this brief
discussion.
12

13
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shareholders who meet the definitions of "complainant" under the Act
may sue a corporation directly:
Subject to subsection (2), a complainant may apply to a court for leave
to bring an action in the name and on behalf of a corporation or any of
its subsidiaries, or intervene in an action to which any such body
corporate is a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or
discontinuing the action on behalf of the body corporate. 14

Subsection (2) of the section requires the complainant give adequate
notice for actions under (1), act in good faith, and that the action appear
to be in the interests of the corporation. 15
The ability of shareholders to sue directors on behalf of the
corporation for breaches of their fiduciary duty has created precedents
surrounding directors' and officers' standard of care, diligence, and
skill. First, in analyzing claims of breach of fiduciary duty by directors,
it is important to state the parameters of the litigation. To begin with, the
burden of prooflies on the plaintiff, as expressed in Barnes v. Andrews
[hereinafter Barnes]: "[t]he plaintiff must accept the burden of showing
that the performance of the [defendant director's] duties would have
avoided loss, and what loss it would have avoided." 16 In meeting the
onus, the plaintiff must prove that the director has failed the duty and
standard of care required by statute and common law. Only then may the
onus shift to the director, who must show they have met the standard of
care, or perhaps invoke one of the defenses discussed below.

IV.

DIRECTORIAL STANDARD OF CARE

Jinnett's general prediction for suits against directors and officers offers
a glimpse into the directorial standard of care and the due diligence
standard discussed below:
Some plaintiffs lawyers are likely to
directors and top management in front
and reckless disregard of their duty
though the Year 2000 problem has

accuse a defendant company's
of the jury, of gross negligence
of care, explaining that even
been known for decades, the

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-44, s. 239(1) [hereinafter CECA].
CECA, s. 239(2).
16
289 F. 614 (S.D. N.Y., 1924) at 616-17.

14
15
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company's directors and management waited until nearly the Year
2000 to begin actual corrective work, did not hold a single board of
directors' meeting on the Year 2000 problem, and did not even
approve a budget for the corrective work, expecting the company's
Information Systems (IS) staff to do all of the work out of its existing
maintenance budget, inevitably leading to a failure of the company's
Year 2000 corrective plan. 17

Breach of fiduciary duty is covered by the CBCA, and further articulated
and defined in American and Canadian case law.
Specifically, since breach of fiduciary duty is a tort of negligence,
case law has developed a distinct standard of care that directors must
clearly meet. The leading decision on this subject is a 1925 English case,
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited. 18 Despite its age,
the case is consistently followed and re-affirmed by contemporary
Canadian and American courts including the Supreme Court of
Canada. 19 Re City Equitable outlines the limitations of any objective
tests for directors facing breach of fiduciary claims:
In order, therefore to ascertain the duties that a person appointed to the
board of an established company undertakes to perform, it is necessary
to consider not only the nature of the company's business, but also the
manner in which the work of the company is in fact distributed
between the directors and other officials of the company. 20

This contextualized view of standard of care has been reiterated by the
British Columbia Supreme Court. In Grindrod & District Credit Union
v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc., 21 Dohm, J. follows Re City Equitable,
and finds the appropriate standard to be "the care, diligence and skill of
reasonably prudent persons. " 22
However, given our statutory framework, Canadian businesses
must meet a stricter duty of care. As Dickerson, Howard, and Getz
emphasized in their 1971 proposals, "the formulation of the duty of care,
diligence and skill owed by directors represents an attempt to upgrade

Supra note 13.
(1924) [1925] 1 Ch. 407, at 427 [hereinafter Re City Equitable].
19 See for e.g. Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp. (1995), 128 D.L.R. (4' 11 ) 73 (S.C.C.);
Soperv. R. (1997) 149 D.L.R. (4' 11 ) 297 (Fed.C.A.).
20 Supra note 18 at 427.
21
(1983), 4 C.C.L.I. 47 (B.C.S.C.)
22 Ibid. at 60.
17

18
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the standard presently required of them." 23 The CECA codifies a more
objective duty of care required of directors and officers:
s. 122 (1) Duty of care of directors and officers Every director and
officer of a corporation in exercising his powers and discharging his
duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of
the corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise in comparable circumstances. 24

The standard is strengthened by the fact that directors and officers
cannot treat this duty as optional; CECA, section 122(2) states clearly
that they have statutory duty to comply with "the Act, the regulations,
articles, by-laws and any unanimous shareholder agreement." 25
Therefore, the standard is one of mandatory, not voluntary, compliance.
The case law interpreting the standard emphasizes corporate
awareness, a component of the statutory "care, diligence and skill"
requirement that will likely play a large role in Year 2000 litigation. As
the Tax Court of Canada elucidates in Merson, "[a] director has an
obligation to be aware of what is happening within the corporation of
which he is a director. Effective lines of communication between him
and the corporation's responsible employees must be present to ensure
the director does not fail his statutory obligations." 26 This
communication will prove to be critical in the Y2K situation, since all
parts of the corporation must be aware of Y2K and a clear system for
fixing, implementing solutions and controlling the bug must be
established throughout the corporation. Therefore, this part of the
directors' s standard is one to which directors and their counsel ought to
pay particular attention. Failing this provision alone may result in the
failure of the rest of the Year 2000 strategy. Unlike some financial or
pure business decisions required of directors, proper treatment of the
problem will require the directors to extend the decision beyond the
boardroom. Cooperation across the corporate structure will ce1iainly
23
R.M.V. Dickerson, J.L. Howard & L. Getz, Proposals for a new Business Co1porations
Law for Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971 ).
24
CECA, s. 122(1).
2s CECA, s. 122(2).
26
[1989] 1 C.T.C. 2074 (T.C.C) at 2084.
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require directors live up to this statutory and common law duty of
communication.
The CECA also allows suits for breaches of honesty and good
faith. 27 Yet, given the highly technical nature of the problem and the
straightforward solutions available, it is unlikely that the bug will create
honesty or good faith dilemmas for directors. This puts the Year 2000
directors's litigation in a unique position. As J.W. Bishop states, in
reference to director's liability suits more generally, "[t]he search for
cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable
in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a
search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack." 28
Simply put, the Y2K issue question demands timely legal analysis and
attention partly because it has few parallels in directors liability
precedents.
Most actions will focus solely on subsection (b). In requiring the
care, diligence and skill of a reasonably prudent person, the language
was intended to upgrade the standard expected of directors and officers.
Applying this to Y2K, it is clear that directors and officers cannot
simply say they do not understand computers, or they are not capable of
re-programming them, and escape liability for the technical problem
and its effects on business. Rather, the statute indicates that there will be
an objective standard, based on the reasonably prudent person. The
Year 2000 bug is an obvious problem, and is well known to be at least a
minor hazard, even if the technical intricacies are not fully understood.
There is an obvious, clear solution available. Directors can design and
implement a system to deal with the problem. As discussed in the final
sections of this paper, a reasonably prudent person would be aware of
the solution, if they turned their mind to the problem. The decision to act
or to ignore the problem is clearly a business decision, within the
jurisdiction of the directors and officers of the corporation.

CECA, s. 122(1)(a).
J.W. Bishop, "Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers" (1968) Yale L.J. 1078 at 1099.
2

7

28
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V.

DEFENSES: COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PROTECTIONS

The outcome ofY2K litigation may rely on how successful directors are
in using various common law and statutory defenses. By the nature of
the issue, defenses will require innovation on the part of the director in
making the standard directors liability defense arguments persuasive,
and on the part of the judiciary in interpreting the current directors
liability legal framework to accept the defenses in this unique
circumstance. Although a number of defenses may be available, 29 this
analysis focuses on directors use of the U.S. business judgment rule,
reliance on experts' reports, and the defense of due diligence currently
used in strict liability cases.
1. Canadian Use of The U.S. Business Judgment Rule

Courts in the past have been reluctant to find directors liable for
breaches of duty or care; this is partly due to the heavy burden placed on
the plaintiff. 30 The courts' s reluctance is also due to their deference to
the corporate structure-particularly the directors role within the
corporate framework. In an analysis of the court's deference to
directors, John Howard compares the standard expected of bureaucrats
and that expected of their corporate counterparts, the directors:
Stated in blunter terms, the bureaucrat's function is carried out in a
structure designed to separate tasks, diffuse responsibility and
implement restraints to minimize risks. The director's function is the
converse. It is to decide among alternative business risks for the
benefit of the corporation and its shareholders, applying the collective
knowledge experience and intuition of a collegiate board. 31

Howard asserts that the courts use the traditional role of the individual
corporate director to justify her or his inability to intervene in decisions
of the collective, corporate board. Essentially, the court finds the role of

29
Jinnett lists a number of potential defenses, including the defense of industry standard
practice claim being barred by a statute of limitations, use of a due diligence defense, and the
business judgment rnle. The latter two are discussed in this paper. For further details, see
Jinnett, supra note 13.
30 Supra note 16 at 616-17.
31
J. Howard, "Takeover Battles and the Business Judgment Rule: Recent American Case
Law Development" (1986) 11 Can Bus L.J. 445 at 447-48.
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"corporate cop" a difficult one, and prefers not to second guess the
decisions of corporate boards. This view is supported by the Delaware
Supreme Court. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 32 a leading U.S. directors' and
officers' liability case, Horsely, J articulates the rationale for the court's
approach: "The Business Judgment Rule exists to protect and promote
the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to . . .
directors. " 33
The court's deference to directors and boards in making corporate
decisions has evolved into an informal defense to actions against
directors, termed the "business judgment rule": "the business judgment
rule means that a court will not, with the benefit of hindsight, impugn a
director's decision that was based on the director's informed and
reasoned business judgment and not vitiated by any conflict of interest
or of duty to a third party."34 In the absence of failing to meet fiduciary
duty, a director may then rely on some discretion from the courts,
provided that they have investigated the situation, listened to experts
when necessary and then made a "reasoned and informed decision." 35
Once again the concept of awareness is key; directors must make
themselves aware of the problem, possible solutions, and the
consequences of their actions.
The parameters of the business judgment rule fit the Year 2000
context very well: there is a specific computer problem of which any
reasonable director will be aware by now, there are computer experts
readily available for consultation, and a plethora of resources on the
Internet alone to guide them to a reasoned and informed decision.
Unlike many other directors and officers liability issues, this
problem is well documented and has a definable solution-reprogramming computer systems, software, hardware, and firmware,
and contacting other companies for assurances of the same on third
party products.
The business judgment rule has become a mainstay in the U.S.
courts, but its use in Canada is questionable. Despite the rule's
foundation in the traditional role of the director and its reliance on
reasonableness, it is unlikely that the rule will be accepted outright in
488 A.2d 858 (1985, Del. S.C.).
Ibid. at 872.
34
Supra note 31 at 446.

32
33
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Canadian directors and officers liability suits. British Columbia's
Supreme Court has shown disdain towards the concept, stating that "the
leniency of the English law towards the conduct and responsibilities of
company directors is a much outdated model. " 36 However, Year 2000
litigation may be the perfect opportunity for Canadian courts to apply
the rule, even if they are reluctant to label the defense as such. In the
Year 2000 context it is reasonable to assume that directors may use the
rule as a defense from liability if they are able to show that their
decisions were based on reasoned and informed business judgment.
Directors must act-and prudently-in order to use the business
judgment rule effectively. It is seems unlikely that omissions would be
shielded by the rule.
2. Reliance on Experts
Because of the structure of Canada's directors and officers liability
laws, Canadian directors may also use the reliance portion of the
business judgment rule independently, without invoking the rule per se.
Section 123(4) of the CBCA allows for directors' reliance on
statements:
A director is not liable under section 118, 119, or 122 if he relies in
good faith on
(a) financial statements of the corporation represented to him by an
officer of the corporation or in a written report of the auditor of
the corporation fairly to reflect the financial condition of the
corporation; or
(b) a report of a lawyer, accountant, engineer, appraiser or other
person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by him. 37

Part (a) will likely not be invoked since the directors and officers decisions
being challenged are not primarily financial, although the overall financial
condition of the corporation may well be implicated in the other decisions
being challenged. It is most likely that directors will attempt to invoke part
(b) of this section as their defense given the technical nature of the problem.
This defense may appear to be an easy, straightfo1ward option, but there

35
36

Ibid. at 450.
Dixon v. Deacon Morgan McEwen Easson (1989), 41 B.C.L.R. (2d) 180 (S.C.) at 195.
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are some major limitations on its use. One of these limitations is directed
towards the use of the expert's report. Namely, a director cannot simply
receive an expert's report and expect to escape liability simply by citing
section 123(4). As emphasized by the Alberta Supreme Court Trial
Division in Northern & Central Gas, "When outsider advice ... is obtained
the directors of a company are entitled to rely on that advice if it is given by
a person appearing to be qualified, but on receipt of such advice, the
directors must themselves exercise their judgment. " 38 The defense requires
directors to act, and take responsibility for their decisions.
Further limitations are made regarding the position and knowledge
of the expert. From a business point of view, expert reports will only by
useful to make decisions if they are complete, and written by a wellinformed specialist in the field. This holds true from a legal point of
view, in that expert reports will only be useful in invoking a section
123(4) defense if they are similarly written. The Court of Queen's
Bench in Alberta has clearly stated that directors cannot rely on this
defense where the expe1i is not properly apprised of all relevant facts. 39
Again, the rule puts responsibility into the hands of the director, who
must choose the expert with care, and ensures that the expert is given the
correct and full facts. This limitation may make the "expert reports"
defense difficult to use in the Year 2000 context. Although the technical
problem is fairly easy to assess, and the facts behind the faulty rollovers, unexpected leap year, and even the place holder problem are
easily discoverable, experts will likely need to advise on the impacts of
the technical problem. Those impacts are not well known at this point,
and gathering all the relevant facts for each area may prove impractical.
As discussed above, the impacts of the Y2K bug are expected to be
complex, and cover many fields. If directors cannot be assured that their
experts are even able to gather all of the relevant facts, then they may be
wary of legally relying on the expert reports in court.
Fmihermore, there may be a limitation on the use of reports from
information systems managers and other company technicians.
CECA, s. 123(4).
C.M. Schmitthoff & J.H. Thomson, Palmer's Company Law (London: Stevens & Sons
Limited, 1968) as cited by Lieberman J. in Northern & Central Gas Corp. v. Hillcrest
Collieries Ltd. [1976] 59 D.L.R. (3d) 533 at 597-98 [emphasis in original].
39
West.fair Foods Ltd. v. Watt (1990), 73 Alta L.R. (2d) 326 at 349-50, aff'd (1991) 79
Alta. L.R. (2d) 363 (C.A.).
37

38
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Although these people will certainly be among the hosts of experts
consulted by directors, they may not fit the section 123 ( 4 )(b)
requirement that experts be in a "profession which lends credibility to a
statement made by him [or her]."40 Unlike the other experts enumerated
in the subsection, information systems managers and computer
programmers are not professionals in the traditional sense of belonging
to a self-governing body that is recognized by the comis. Infonnation
system managers and programmers are not typically given the same
status as experts whose professional relationships are based on fiduciary
principles or even matters of trust and confidentiality. Shareholders
would be likely to push this issue if a director invoked section 123(4) for
reliance on a programmer's "expert report," underscoring the role of the
experts as "mere technicians," not legally recognized professionals.
Given the courts' unfamiliarity with the field, and lack of a "profession"
to give the expert inherent credibility, the courts may cede to the
shareholders on this point, weakening the defense further.
Well-infonned defense lawyers, however, may be able to persuade
the court that, in specific cases, software programmers are "engineers,"
and are treated as such in their education (often through faculties of
engineering), by their pay scales, and by their responsibilities in the
workplace. This is an area that requires clarification in Canadian
corporate law, as corporations increase their use of and reliance on
computers, computer networks, information systems and "technology"
generally.
Section 123 of the CECA appears to offer another possible avenue
of defense, a dissent from "any resolution passed or action taken
thereat."41 A director who disagrees with a particular action or decision
of the board, and follows the procedures for dissenting as laid out in the
section, would presumably escape liability for the board's action.
However, this defense has two limitations: one inherent, and one
particular to the Year 2000 situation. The inherent limitation is one of
procedure. Dissent may only work as a defense if the director actively
dissents from the resolution or motion. Thus, to use the defense,
directors must vote against resolutions pe1mitting the action, and the

40
This requirement of relying on a person of a "profession" has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada. See for e.g. Blair v. Consolidated Enfield C01p. supra note 19.
41
CECA, s. 123(1).
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acts in question must be among those covered at sections 118, 119, or
122 of the Act. 42 The types of claims expected in Y2K litigation do not
specify liability only where the director consented, although this may be
implied in the onus on the plaintiff to prove that the director acted to
cause the loss. The second limitation, specific to the Y2K context, is the
reality that boards of directors will not pass motions resolving to do
nothing about the bug, or not to meet the industry and legal standard for
reducing and managing the problem, risks, and impact of the bug. The
behaviour challenged by the shareholders will presumably be inaction
and insufficient action by the directors towards the problem. This would
not attract the conditions precedent for a director to dissent from the acts
or decisions.
3. Due Diligence: Legal Analogies and Y2K
Perhaps the most cogent defense will be that of due diligence. The
straightforward nature of the problem may make the definition of the
due diligence standard relatively easy, despite the lack of direct
precedents. Unlike many other actions against corporations where there
are discrepancies about the nature of the business decision and whether
it indeed requires some action, this problem is recognizable with a clear
solution. The Y2K problem for directors may be analyzed through legal
analogy with the environmental due diligence cases, and computer virus
situations. Although these cases relate to specific statutory offences, and
there are no comparable Y2K statutory offenses in Canada at this time,
the environmental and computer virus case law ought to give directors
and officers some indication of the standard of diligence and skill
expected in the Y2K context.
The environmental cases are appropriate for analogy to the Y2K
situation because these cases involve directors making decisions over
areas in which they do not have technical expertise. Just as a C.E.O. of a
major manufacturing company is not likely to understand the
technicalities of the dumping processes of the company's mills, most
directors are not likely to understand the technicalities or the full
potential impact of the Year 2000 problem. Yet, the standards required
of both of these directors demand that they take responsibilities for
42

CBCA, s. 118 - Directors' liability; s. 119 - Liability of directors for wages; s. 122 Duty of care of directors and officers.
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decisions outside their expertise. Although environmental cases tend to
be prosecuted under environmental laws, the standard required is
strikingly similar to the CECA provisions discussed above: the directors
must meet a standard of due diligence. 43
There are two key environmental cases in Canadian law to which
Year 2000 litigators may look for guidance on due diligence: R v. City of
Sault Ste. Marie, 44 and R. v. Bata. 45 Sault Ste. Marie defines three
categories of offences, including one of strict liability that requires a
defense of due diligence. Bata poses fundamental questions that must be
addressed in reviewing directors' defense of due diligence. In Sault Ste.
Marie, the court clearly defines strict liability offences as, "[ o]ffences in
which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the existence of
mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the
offense."46 Further, the decision enunciates a clear definition of the due
diligence standard: the strict liability offense leaves "it open to the
accused to avoid liability by proving he took all reasonable care. This
involves consideration of what a reasonable man would have done in the
circumstances."47 This reasonable test appears similar to the test in Re
City Equitable, but is a more objective test. In Re City Equitable the
standard was a reasonable man with the experience and circumstances
of the director in question. In Sault Ste. Marie, the due diligence
standard is based on what the reasonable director would do, without
specifying it must be a reasonable person of the same experience and/or
circumstances.
Sault Ste. Marie informs Year 2000 litigators of the need to ensure
their clients can prove their actions were those of a reasonable person,
regardless of their experience. Sault Ste. Marie also offers a clear
definition of when the due diligence defense is operable: "[t]he defense
will be available if the accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of
facts which, if true, would render the act or omission innocent, or he

43
See Bata, injh1 note 45, where directors were under a statutory duty not to dispose of
materials contrary to the Act and regulations.
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(1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 330 (Ont. Ct. (Prov. Div.)). This case was appealed to the Ontario
Court of Appeal, but the appeal judgment did not deal with the due diligence standard.
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Supra note 44 at 1326.
47
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took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular event." 48 These
limitations on the applicability of the due diligence standard will likely
be applied in the Year 2000 situation. The use of mistaken facts may be
applied when a director has been informed by someone else of the
problem that requires a decision, and the possible choices. As in the
environmental cases, the Year 2000 situation demands a wider
knowledge of the technicalities than a director is likely to possess. It is
likely that a director will ask for assistance from an expert in the field,
such as a manager of Information Systems within the corporation. 49
Some smaller or less technically inclined corporations may need to look
outside their businesses for assistance.
To use this mistaken facts portion of the defense, directors will
need to prove that the information they received was actually
"mistaken." Reliance on mistaken facts is a reasonable scenario in the
Y2K context because of the obvious limitations on a director's ability to
fully comprehend the technicalities of the problem and, more
importantly, all of the aspects of the solution. Proving these facts were
mistaken will vary depending on the circumstances of each case. It is
reasonable to predict that a report that makes sweeping generalizations
about the problem's potential solutions will not be reasonable to rely on.
Unfortunately, given the relatively low levels of awareness and
preparedness in small and medium sized Canadian companies, reliance
on such simplistic generalizations may be a reality. Rather, for the
defense to be used, the facts must appear reasonable to the director, and
be directed specifically at answering the director's concerns and gaps in
knowledge surrounding the problem. This issue is further analyzed
below, since this portion of due diligence overlaps with the statutory
defense of reliance on experts' reports, through section 123(4) of the
CBCA. 50
The defence of "taking reasonable steps to avoid the particular
event" 51 is more likely to be met in the year 2000 context. Just as
environmental hazards require highly technical, highly complex
solutions, so does the Y2K problem, particularly in large corporations.
48
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A system must be put into place by directors, even if they do not have
the technical knowledge to implement it. It is also predictable that both
parts of the defense will be used by directors when establishing they
have met their duty of due diligence. In order for directors to devise and
implement complex, company wide solutions that include major
decisions to be made in the information systems, human resources,
finance, and legal departments, directors will likely need to consult and
rely on experts to explain the problem and devise a workable, legally
defensible system.
The Bata decision expands on this requirement in environmental
cases for having "comprehensive and effective environmental
management systems to identify, manage, and control the risk of hann
to the environment." 52 In Bata, Ormston J. accepted a leading U.S. case
Michigan Natural Resources Commission v. Arco Industries 53 as it was
discussed in a Canadian legal text by Dianne Saxe. 54 The court in Ba ta
puts emphasis on three inten-elated points from Arco: (i) the balance of
corporate responsibility in general and specific responsibilities for
health and safety; (ii) the role and ability of an individual (director); and
(iii) a discussion of corporate and societal responsibility.
First, it is underscored that "a court under the circumstances [Arco]
should weigh the factors of the corporate individual's degree of
authority in general and specific responsibility for health and safety
practices, including hazardous waste disposal." 55 This standard is to be
applied in answering the question whether the individual could have
prevented the harm. In turn, this perspective reinforces the view
expressed earlier in Barnes, that the plaintiff must prove that the
individual respondent could have prevented the harm. 56 In Y2K cases,
the very nature of the problem (inability to deal with the inevitable date
rollover) makes the standard seem patently obvious-the date rollover
to the Year 2000 was going to come, and it is a well known problem
within the field of computer software, hardware, and manufacturing.
Weir Foulds, Toronto "Environmental Law" online: <www.weirfoulds.com/business/
bus 13 .html> (date accessed: March 27, 1998).
53
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Secondly, Arco instructs on the evidentiary requirements of
directors' liability defenses:
This court will look at evidence of an individual's authority to control,
among other things, waste handling practices-evidence such as
whether the individual holds the position of officer or director,
especially where there is a co-existing management position;
distribution of wealth within the corporation, including the position in
the corporate hierarchy and percentage of shares owned. Weighed
along with the power factors will be evidence of responsibility
undertaken for waste disposal practices, including evidence of
responsibility undertaken and neglected, as well as affirmative
attempts to prevent unlawfitl waste disposal. [emphasis added] 57

Waste management would be an on-going responsibility for an officer
or director, whereas the Y2K problem is only a one-time event. This
focus on the individual's ability to control the waste management
practices may be useful in Y2K liability cases, since the duties required
of the directors are similar. Complications and losses due to Y2K can
clearly be mitigated if a director undertakes his or her responsibility.
Just as directors are expected to prevent unlawful harm to the physical
environment in environmental cases, in the Y2K litigation context
directors are expected to prevent harm to the corporate environment.
Although directors do not face statutory offences in the Y2K context,
they do face the possibility of private litigation. Directors in both cases
are obligated to follow the law, be it statutory or common law. It is
highly appropriate then, for Canadian courts to adopt these evidentiary
requirements in Y2K litigation in the same way that Bata reinforced
them for environmental cases.
Lastly, Arco as cited in Bata emphasizes the social and corporate
position of the director, which is "implicitly undertaken by the
acquisition of increased power or authority within the corporation and
responsibility explicitly unde1iaken by job description or agreement."58
This increased responsibility under job requirements or contractual
agreement is not unique to corporations engaged in environmental
litigation. Rather, corporate responsibilities have a double resonance in
Y2K litigation. In the normal course of corporate business, the potential
for taking a cheaper and possibly less reasonable or responsible

57
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approach increases as one's financial stake in the corporation grows.
Second, the impetus to act is fueled by the fact that the business may
suffer or fail if a Y2K "breach" is committed. This is in contrast with
many environmental offenses, such as in Bata. In environmental
situations, there is often a cheap alternative that does not harm the
company, unless it is caught for the infraction. Therefore, recognizing
the corporate and social responsibility of a corporation's decision
makers is doubly important. Without appropriate directorial action on
the issue, both the reputation and the fiscal health of the corporation are
jeopardized.
Applying these statements from the Arco decision, the Bata
decision offers specific guidance to establishing the standard required of
directors in the form of a "useful checklist." 59 Ormston J. outlines the
essential criteria:
I ask myself the following questions in assessing the defense of due
diligence:
(a) Did the board of directors establish a pollution prevention
"system" as indicated in R v. Ste Sault Marie i.e., was there
supervision or inspection? Was there improvement in business
methods? Did he exhort those he controlled or influenced?
(b) Did each director ensure that the corporate officers have been
instructed to set up a system sufficient within the terms and
practices of its industry of ensuring compliance with
environmental laws, to ensure that the officers report back
periodically to the board on the operation of the system, and to
ensure that the officers are instructed to report any substantial
non-compliance to the board in the timely manner?
I reminded myself that:
(c) The directors are responsible for reviewing the environmental
compliance reports provided by the officers of the corporation,
but are justified in placing reasonable reliance on reports
provided to them by corporate officers, consultants, counsel or
other informed parties.
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(d) The directors should substantiate that the officers are promptly
addressing environmental concerns brought to their attention by
government agencies or other concerned parties including
shareholders.
(e) The directors should be aware of the standards of the industry
and other industries which deal with similar environmental
pollutants or risks.
(f) The directors should immediately and personally react when

they have notice the system has failed. [emphasis in original] 60

In addition to this general framework, the court states that "one would
hope to find remedial and contingency plans for spills, a system of
ongoing environmental audit, training programs, sufficient authority to
act and other indices of a proactive environmental policy." 61 There is a
clear emphasis on the need for a structured, systematic approach to
preventing, controlling, and mitigating error. In short, the director( s)
must formulate a plan and follow it responsibly.
To apply the above framework to the Y2K situation, judges will
require better knowledge of the situation. One of the above problems is
that while directors must follow written environmental laws and
regulations-and these are easily available for analysis and
interpretation by the judge or other trier of fact-there are no similar
written laws or regulations laid down for Y2K. As described earlier,
there are both statutory and common law requirements of directors, but
these do not include minimum standards as environmental laws or
regulations might. For instance, in the environmental context,
companies have limits on the amounts of waste dumped. In the absence
of specific guidance on the minimum levels of action or prevention
required, directors and judges alike will need to apply these due
diligence questions and principles on a case by case basis. Until the first
few cases are litigated, there will be no common law standard for action.

4. Computer Viruses
Due diligence has also been cited as an applicable defense in another
area of computer law: liability for computer viruses. At first glance,
computer virus cases may not appear appropriate for use in Y2K
60
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analysis, since computer virus cases are typically product liability cases.
Typical Y2K cases may not deal with product liability, but rather
consider the end result of the faults in the computerized systems over
which the directors have control. Product liability may be a factor in
Y2K directors' and officers' suits, where the corporation in question
deals in computer software, hardware, or computerized equipment. Still,
the computer virus analogy to Y2K is applicable, since the outcomes
and affects may be the same for both these computer problems.
A computer virus can be defined as:
a program which in some manner, assumes control of a portion of the
computer without the rightful user's consent, often to a destructive
end. In computer science terms, a software virus is a program which is
dedicated to assuming control of some part of the computer without
the rightful operator's consent and which can replicate and spread
from one machine to another through apparently harmless contact. 62

Taking this non-technical definition, the comparison with the Year 2000
context is clear: while the computer is still controlled by its rightful
owner in the Year 2000 problem, the effects may be greatly destructive
to a company's data and operations. The comparison with the more
technical computer science definition is illustrative of the problem Y2K
may create on a network: although the Year 2000 bug need not travel
from one computer to the other, the result on the network would be the
same, the systemic shut down of operations, corruption of data, and
incapacity of computers to work beyond the key rollover and transition
dates if the problem is not fixed.
These similarities in the effects of computer viruses and the Y2K
problem lead to similarities in the way liability for these problems will
be treated by corporations and courts alike. A lack of direct precedents
for Y2K litigation will lead lawyers and courts to draw analogies, such
as those to environmental due diligence and computer virus cases. In
Australia, one group risk manager at a public utility has applied due
diligence standards as established in the environmental cases, to other
parts of the corporation: "A lot of people looked at due diligence from
an environmental point of view .... Certainly, we did ... because of our
popular by-products. But there are so many other things an organization
62 R.D. Desilets, Jr., "Software Exposure to Products Liability for Computer Viruses"
(1988-89) 9 Computer/ L.J. 509 at 511.
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can do [in] a due diligence program, so their directors can be sure that
things are being handled properly. " 63 The standard expected for
computer viruses, the Australian executive maintains, is due diligence
as it is for environmental cases, because "viruses are an obvious threat to
business, particularly in the private sector where computer records are
linked directly to sales and survival."64
Using due diligence in computer cases is not a new thought. In fact,
the applicability of strict liability with the defense of due diligence in
computer cases has been considered since the early 1980s. In his 1983
Computer Law Journal article, David Hall lays out the reasons for
considering strict liability for computer cases:
First, the party in the best position to detect and eliminate defects
should be responsible for damages inflicted by defective products.
Second, liability should be placed upon the party best able to absorb
and spread the risk or cost of injuries through insurance. Third, a
remedy should not be prevented by burdensome requirements of
proof, since an injured person is not normally in a position to identify
the cause of the defect. Fourth, due to modern marketing methods,
computers rely on the reputation of a manufacturer and no longer
adhere to the doctrine of caveat emptor. 65

This four point analysis has been directly applied to the use of strict
liability computer virus cases, in a 1989 miicle in the same journal,
entitled "Software Vendor's Exposure to Products Liability for
Computer Viruses." 66 The author enumerates major policy reasons for
imposing strict liability in computer virus situations:
It makes more sense for the originator of a program, who possesses

both the expertise and the human readable form of a program, to look
for defects, such as computer viruses. It also makes sense to place the
burden on the software originator to show that the software is free
from the type of defect that would cause the injury claimed. 67
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Making strict liability an option in computer virus litigation makes due
diligence a defense by extension. In light of the general and technical
similarities between computer viruses and the Year 2000 bug, it also
makes sense to apply, by analogy, due diligence standards to Year 2000
liability cases. The end user is harmed, damages are created by the
misuse, poor development, or mismanagement of the technology, and
the corporation is in a position to prevent or mitigate these damages.
Similarly, litigation in the Y2K context will ensue if the corporation's
directors do not act, just as corporations are sued for similar misguided
acts or omissions in computer software and hardware development.
In summary, the due diligence defense is both the most promising
defense and the easiest to employ. As Warren Reid states in his article
on the legal fallout from the Y2K bug, in addressing directors and
officers on the issue ofY2K, "[i]t turns out that the same tasks you need
to perform to defend yourself are also the same ones you need to solve
the Year 2000 problem for your organisation. So, in this sense, doing the
right thing, in fact will work for your systems, for your organisation, as
well as in comi!" 68 Meeting the due diligence standard makes good legal
sense and good business sense.
5. Due Diligence in the Year 2000 Context
Once the applicability of the due diligence defense is established, the
director must present evidence of what this standard is, and
subsequently prove that they have lived up to the due diligence standard.
In considering the standard for due diligence, the court ought to
recognize that the standard will be a subjective one. The subjective
element will depend on the position of the director or officer in question,
the corporate structure, the extent, impact, and effects of the Year 2000
bug in that industry, and the specific corporate entity. Simply put, a
small retail firm ought not be held up to the same due diligence standard
as a national banking institution, since the requirements, needs, and
expectations in the industry are markedly different.
Applying the general due diligence standard to the specific
technical, legal, and business circumstances of the Year 2000 bug, there
is a general consensus that directors and officers must actually

68
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formulate, implement, and follow up on a formal, multi-department
solution. Like environmental cases, the Year 2000 bug cases will
require directors and officers to implement a system of care and control,
to avoid and manage the damage caused by the problem. Although most
experts agree on the necessary components of the solution, they often
express the steps differently. The "core" activities for the "system of
care and control" are enumerated by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants (CICA): having a project team in place, making an
organization-wide impact assessment, developing a plan, taking action,
monitoring progress, updating the plan and reporting, and developing
contingency plans. 69 The CICA is only one of dozens of organizations
and associations that is providing information to its members on this
subject. From the sheer volume of material that has been available to
directors since 1997, it would be hard to say that directors have not had
access to information about how to formulate a "Y2K plan."
Other authors have been more specific in outlining the
requirements of due diligence for the courtroom and the corporation's
bottom line. In his article on the legal fallout from the Y2K bug, WaITen
Reid identifies nine steps that are indicative of the specific standards
comis are likely to look for:
[e]stablishing a steering committee to plan and oversee the Year 2000
compliance project; inventory of software (and hardware); risk
assessment and statement of impact; communication across all levels
of the organisation; a detailed plan to fix the problem; producing a
budget and critical path analysis; documentation to show that the plan
was followed , and completed; status reports regarding the work plan,
work completed, problems that arose and solutions implemented, and
follow up; and finally documents to show that alternatives were
considered. 70

This comprehensive list of steps and required documentation should be
a sufficient guide from the director's perspective.
There are additional acts that corporate counsel would be wise to
perfonn if corporate counsel is also the director in question. Counsel
should ensure all licenses and agreements have been audited, review all
corporate and directors-and-officers insurance policies in light of the
69
70
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Year 2000 bug, and identify all parties who the corporation may sue or
be sued by. 71 These steps are particularly crucial for directors who are
also corporate counsel for the entity being sued. It is likely that
corporate counsel will face a higher standard of care and thus stricter
expectations for their due diligence defense due to their position and
professional status within the corporation.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

Given the technical problem, risks, and lack of corporate awareness in
Canada of Y2K and its possible effects, it is likely that shareholders will
be in a position to sue under the CECA. Section 239 allows for
shareholders to sue on behalf of the corporation, and the predictable and
controllable nature of the problem makes the situation ripe for suits to be
filed as soon as losses may be determined. Yet, it is unlikely the comis
will be flooded with suits immediately. The losses, mismanagement,
and evidence of breaches of fiduciary duty may not appear until weeks
or months into the year 2000. Therefore, the suits are likely to be filed
throughout the limitation periods available for the different breaches.
Moreover, legislative action may help close the floodgates. The
Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
considered directors' liability in their review of the CECA, and made a
number of recommendations. The committee suggested that the federal
government "strongly consider incorporating by reference into the
CECA provincial laws that overlap with provision of the CECA." 72 This
would allow for predictability and reduce conflict between the
jurisdictions, and would be particularly helpful in establishing the
statutory parameters for the law suits and the possible defenses. The
Committee also turned their attention to the specific problem of due
diligence, concluding that due diligence be codified as a defense for a
71 For details see M. Stuhlmiller, "Can you hear the lawyers singing 'We're gonna party
like it's 1999'?: The Fiduciary Duty of Officers and Directors to Become Year 2000
Compliant" online: <www.year2000.com/archive/lawpaiiy.html> (date accessed: June 20,
1997).
72 The Standing Committee on banking Trade and Commerce, "Corporate Governance"
online: <www.parl.gc.ca/english/senate/com-e/bank-e/rep-e/cgo-e.html> (date accessed:
March 7, 1998).
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number of offenses under the CECA, including section 122 breaches of
duty, under which Y2K litigation is most likely to fall. Throughout their
directors' liability proposals, the Committee seeks to expand the scope
of due diligence as a defense, stating that all federal laws that impose
liability on directors ought to be amended to include a codified due
diligence defense. Should the recommendations of the committee be
embraced by Parliament, directors, and officers of Canadian
corporations would stand a much better chance at launching effective,
full defenses to Y2K litigation, since their best defense will be available
by right. Naturally, corporations will still need to meet the due diligence
standard, and doing so will still be good for business and for their legal
position.
Although Parliament has not produced legislation specifically
aimed at Y2K bug and subsequent litigation, it could follow the lead
being set by a number of American states. Some jurisdictions have
introduced, and in some cases already passed, legislation to prevent
Y2K litigation against government, agencies and public departments,
while other states have extended limits on litigation between private
parties as well. 73 California Bill AB 1710, submitted by California State
Assemblyman Brooks Firestone, is directed at limiting the damages that
can be claimed and the monetary amounts awarded. The rationale for the
bill is a desire to "control the liability costs of an expected blizzard of
lawsuits triggered by the millennium bug." 74 This is a crucial objective
for California, since it is a Mecca for software companies and the high
tech industry generally. Making the jurisdiction more friendly to
prospective defendants of the bug will help promote and foster their
high tech industry.
Critics such as California lawyer Dean Moorehous claim that the
bill actually creates less predictability in litigation, since it will "spark
confusion about the appropriate measure of damages in Year 2000
failure cases."75 Moorehous also claims that there is no solid rationale
for limiting recove1y for breach of fiduciary duties or securities fraud
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claims. The bill proposes this by treating all Y2K suits the same. Since
this bill has not yet passed committee, and may be destined to die on the
order paper, Canada might be best to take Moorehous' comments to
heart and find non-statutory limitations for Y2K. The existing Canadian
federal legislation as demonstrated in this paper, is already fit to deal
with Y2K suits by providing possible claims for potential complainants,
and realistic defenses for directors and officers.
Legislative proposals will not solve the problem for Canadian
companies. Even if due diligence and recovery limits are codified,
companies will still need to prepare for and meet the challenge of Y2K.
Although partial reliance on aspects of the business judgment rule and
reliance on expert reports and dissents may be available to directors,
they must look to their bottom line now, and consider how they can
achieve due diligence for the sake of their company's business as well as
its legal standing. Although Canadians are not typically as litigious as
Americans, Canadian companies would be best served preparing for the
worst and hoping for the best.

